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Abstract 
 “The History and Development of the Choice Principle” is split into different categories of Australian and 
New Zealand cases in relation to the choice principle: dividend stripping, tax loss grouping provisions, inflated 
deductions, and income splitting. It considers the official position of the Inland Revenue Department on the 
choice principle, and sets out arguments for and against the advantages of adopting the principle in New 
Zealand.  
Keywords: choice principle, tax avoidance, income tax 
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The History and Development of the Choice Principle 
I Introduction 
The choice principle was first established by the High Court of Australia in WP Keighery 
Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation.1 The principle relates to the application of the 
general anti-avoidance rule (GAAR) where taxpayers have chosen to structure arrangements 
in a way legally open to them under legislation. In Keighery, the majority said: 2 
Whatever difficulties there may be in interpreting s 260 [the GAAR], one thing at least is 
clear: the section intends only to protect the general provisions of the Act from frustration, 
and not to deny to taxpayers any right of choice between alternatives which the Act itself 
lays open to them. It is therefore important to consider whether the result of treating the 
section as applying in a case … would be to render ineffectual an attempt to defeat etc. a 
liability imposed by the Act or to render ineffectual an attempt to give a company an 
advantage which the Act intended that it might be given. 
New Zealand courts have never directly applied the principle, although in a number of cases 
the courts have indirectly applied it.3 Australian courts applied the principle until the 1980s, 
after which the courts seemed to begin applying the GAAR if tax avoidance was one of the 
purposes of arrangements, irrespective of the choices open to taxpayers under legislation.  
In parts II to V the paper considers the courts' treatment of the choice principle by looking 
at how the courts have applied the principle in different types of cases. This paper considers 
four categories of cases: dividend stripping, inflated deductions, income splitting, and tax 
                                                
1 WP Keighery Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1957) 100 CLR 66 (HCA). 
2 At 109. 
3 For example, the dissent in Challenge Corporation Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1986] 2 NZLR 
513 (PC). See pp 26-28. 
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loss grouping provisions. Many other cases fall within the ambit of this paper, but due to the 
paper’s restricted length, some cases have had to be excluded. Part VI sets out the official 
position of the Inland Revenue Department on the choice principle. Lastly, part VII 
concludes the paper with arguments for and against adopting the choice principle in New 
Zealand. 
II Dividend Stripping 
A Context 
WP Keighery Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation, Newton v Federal Commissioner 
of Taxation,4 and Slutzkin v Federal Commissioner of Taxation were cases that involved 
dividend stripping.5  
At the time the High Court of Australia heard these cases, Australia had a classical taxation 
system in place, so a company’s profits were taxed twice: first, when initially earned by a 
company, and second, when received by shareholders as dividends. This encouraged 
companies to retain their earnings, or find ways to distribute profits that attracted less tax.6 
If private companies retained excessive amounts of profit, they had to pay a type of tax 
known as div. 7 tax. The New Zealand equivalent of div. 7 tax was excessive retention tax.  
Public companies were not subject to div. 7 tax, because most public companies are listed, 
and so are run in the best interests of their shareholders. Not all public companies are listed, 
however, and legislative requirements in place at the time the cases in this part were heard 
                                                
4 Newton v The Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia [1958] AC 450 (PC). 
5 Slutzkin v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1977) 140 CLR 314 (HCA). 
6 Sam Reinhardt and Lee Steel “A brief history of Australia’s tax system” (2006) Australian Government The 
Treasury <http://archive.treasury.gov.au/documents/1156/HTML/docshell.asp?URL=01_Brief_History.asp> 
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made it relatively easy for a private company to become a public company. Therefore, some 
private companies decided to become public companies to avoid having to pay div. 7 tax.  
Alternately, others entered into arrangements in which shareholders sold shares of profitable 
companies that had large amounts of retained earnings to dividend stripping companies, 
essentially converting revenue receipts (dividends) into capital receipts (payment for shares).  
Dividend stripping operations usually have these characteristics:7  
• [A] target company, which had substantial undistributed profits creating a potential 
tax liability either for the company or its shareholders 
• the sale or allotment of shares in the target company to another party 
• the payment of a dividend to the purchaser or allottee of the shares out of the target 
company’s profits; 
• the purchaser escaping … tax on the dividend so declared … and 
• the vendor shareholders receiving a capital sum for their shares in an amount the 
same as or very close to the dividends paid to the purchasers … [and] 
[T]hat they were carefully planned, with all the parties acting in concert, for the 
predominant if not the sole purpose of the vendor shareholders, in particular, avoiding 
tax on a distribution of dividends by the target company. 
B Cases 
1 WP Keighery Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation 
In Keighery, Mr and Mrs Keighery held shares in Aquila Steel Pty Ltd. Since Aquila was a 
private company, if it retained excessive profits it would be liable for div. 7 tax, but if it 
distributed dividends, its shareholders would have to pay tax. Mr and Mrs Keighery entered 
                                                
7 Lawrence v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2008) 70 ATR 376 at 61. 
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into an arrangement that enabled a public company, WP Keighery Pty Ltd, to retain the 
profits of Aquila, which allowed them to avoid having to pay div. 7 tax on the profits.8 A 
further benefit of the arrangement was that WP Keighery Pty Ltd could distribute dividends 
to Mr and Mrs Keighery at a rate that ensured Mr and Mrs Keighery’s income tax rates did 
not enter higher tax brackets.9 The Commissioner argued that WP Keighery Pty Ltd was a 
private company, so div. 7 tax applied, or that in the alternative the GAAR applied.10 The 
court held that the GAAR did not apply,11 even though the taxpayer had admitted that it had 
entered into the arrangement to reduce its tax liability.12 The taxpayer was entitled to choose 
between alternatives open to it under the Act. Applying the GAAR to the arrangement would 
make redundant a tax advantage Parliament intended to provide to taxpayers.13 Therefore, 
the GAAR did not apply, and the taxpayer was able to escape having to pay tax on retained 
profits.  
2 Newton v Federal Commissioner of Taxation 
In Newton, three profitable companies entered into dividend stripping operations to reduce 
their tax liability. The taxpayer was a shareholder in one of the companies. 14  The 
shareholders sold their shares in the company for £460,000 to a dividend stripping company, 
Pactolus Ltd. Pactolus received a £460,000 dividend from the company, and then sold the 
shares to one of its subsidiaries for £80,000. While Pactolus had to pay tax on the dividends, 
because its business involved dealing in shares, it was able to deduct the £360,000 loss it 
had made (£460,000 purchase price of the shares less £80,000 sale price).15 Therefore, 
                                                
8 WP Keighery Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation, above n 1, at 83-85. 
9 At 92. 
10 At 85. 
11 WP Keighery Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation, above n 1, at 86-90. 
12 At 92. 
13 At 92-93. 
14 Newton v The Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia, above n 4, at 4. 
15 At 5. 
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Pactolus only had to pay tax on £80,000,16 and the shareholders were able to avoid paying 
tax by converting what would have been a revenue receipt into a capital receipt. The 
shareholders then reinvested most of the £460,000 they had received for the shares back into 
the company.17 The Commissioner argued that the GAAR applied.18 
Lord Denning famously held:19  
[T]o bring an arrangement within the section you must be able to predicate – by looking at 
the overt acts by which it was implemented – that it was implemented in that particular way 
so as to avoid tax. If you cannot so predicate, but have to acknowledge that the transactions 
are capable of explanation by reference to ordinary business or family dealing, without 
necessarily being labelled as a means to avoid tax, then the arrangement does not come 
within the section.  
The purpose of the arrangement was to increase the capital of the companies by enabling 
them to retain profits while avoiding div. 7 tax.20 It also enabled the shareholders to receive 
the money that they did not reinvest tax free, which but for the arrangement would have 
been a taxable dividend.21 The court applied the GAAR, and treated the entire amount paid 
for the shares as a dividend.22  
Lord Denning said Keighery was a case to which the predication test would not apply.23 His 
statement seems bizarre, however, considering Keighery was a dividend stripping case, 
comparable with Newton. One could easily predicate that the taxpayers in Keighery entered 
into the arrangement to avoid tax, as was concluded by the court in Keighery, which stated 
                                                
16 At 5. 
17 At 6. 
18 At 6. 
19 At 8. 
20 At 6. 
21 At 9-10. 
22 At 11. 
23 At 9. 
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that avoiding tax was the main, if not exclusive, purpose of the arrangement.24 The court in 
Newton did not discuss the choice principle, but the predication test is very different from 
the choice principle, focussing on economic substance over legal form. Therefore, it would 
seem that the choice principle and predication test are irreconcilable, and that the court in 
Newton impliedly rejected the choice principle. 
3 Slutzkin v Federal Commissioner of Taxation 
In Slutzkin, the taxpayer, Mr Slutzkin, held shares in a profitable holding company.25 To 
avoid having to pay tax on dividends, he sold his shares to a dividend stripping company. 
The payment he received for the shares was on capital account, so it was not taxable.26 The 
Commissioner argued that the GAAR applied because the payment Mr Slutzkin received 
was “in truth dividends” since he had effectively converted a revenue receipt into a capital 
receipt.27 The High Court of Australia applied the choice principle. Barwick CJ said that 
taxpayers may choose how to structure their assets and transactions, even if they structure 
them so that their tax liability is minimised:28 
There is no room … for any doctrine of economic equivalence. To the legal form and 
consequence of the taxpayer’s transaction, which in fact has taken place, effect must be given.  
Aickin J discussed Newton briefly in his judgment, declining to apply the predication test 
because he held that the transactions in Slutzkin did not frustrate or defeat the Act’s “ordinary 
provisions” and so did not attract tax. 29  He said that even if the court did apply the 
predication test to the facts of Slutzkin, the GAAR would not apply because the sale of shares 
                                                
24 WP Keighery Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation, above n 1, at 109. 
25 Slutzkin v Federal Commissioner of Taxation, above n 5, at 314. 
26 At 315. 
27 At 315. 
28 At 319 per Barwick CJ. 
29 At 325 per Aikin J. 
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was an “ordinary business dealing”.30 This was based on evidence that Mr Slutzkin merely 
wished to sell his shares in the company.31  
Slutzkin is not as dramatic a case of avoidance as Keighery, because prima facie the 
arrangement entered into by the taxpayer appears to be an ordinary transaction. Slutzkin is 
clearly an avoidance case, however, because the arrangements enabled Mr Slutzkin to avoid 
tax: by selling the shares without the company first distributing dividends, Mr Slutzkin 
received both the price of the shares and the value of the dividends in the form of a capital 
payment for the shares. If he had received dividends from the company first, he would have 
had to pay tax on the dividends because dividends are ordinarily on revenue account. 32 
Applying the predication test, one could predicate that Mr Slutzkin decided to sell the shares 
rather than receive a dividend from the company to avoid “a heavy tax liability”.33 Mr 
Slutzkin would have received part of the sale price of the shares as income via dividends, 
and would have to pay tax on it, so realistically he should have to pay tax on part of the sale 
price of the shares.  
Slutzkin is an example of an endogenous avoidance case, which is case involving a 
seemingly ordinary business arrangement that a taxpayer has deliberately structured in a 
way that avoids tax. In contrast, exogenous cases involve ordinary businesses entering into 
transactions separate from their businesses with no purpose other than to avoid tax. Aickin 
J’s discussion of Newton, and the supposed inapplicability of the predication test because of 
the ordinariness of the arrangement in Slutzkin, supports the classification of Slutzkin as an 
endogenous case.  
                                                
30 At 329 per Aikin J. 
31 At 329 per Aikin J. 
32 At 319 per Barwick CJ; at 321 per Stephen J; at 325 per Barwick CJ. 
33 At 321 per Stephen J. 
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Keighery and Newton, on the other hand, are arguably exogenous cases, because in both 
cases the taxpayers entered into separate arrangements for the sole purpose of avoiding tax. 
Irrespective of the exogenous and endogenous labels applicable to the cases, however, there 
seems to be only one material difference between the facts of Keighery, Newton and Slutzkin. 
The difference is that in Keighery and Newton, the funds involved returned to the companies, 
whereas in Slutzkin, once the shares were sold to the dividend stripper, the funds received 
by the taxpayer were not returned to the company involved. In all three cases, the taxpayers 
avoided tax, so whether the cases were endogenous or exogenous, the courts should 
consistently have applied, or declined to apply, the choice principle. Moreover, the reasoning 
used by the judges to distinguish between the cases, such as Aickin J’s reasoning for 
distinguishing Slutzkin from Newton, can be criticised as stipulative reasoning, because the 
judges merely made firm statements as to why the cases differed, without actually reasoning 
at all. The decisions in Slutzkin, Keighery, and Newton should not have differed. The courts 
should have applied the choice principle in all three cases, or not applied it at all.  
III Inflated Deductions 
A Context 
Cecil Bros Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation,34 Elmiger v Commissioner of 
Inland Revenue,35 and Ben Nevis Foresty Ventures Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue 
are cases in which taxpayers have inflated deductions to reduce their tax liability.36 Where 
taxpayers incur expenses as part of their income earning processes, provided the expenses 
are on revenue account they are deductible. The expenses are deducted from taxpayers’ gross 
                                                
34 Cecil Bros Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1964) 111 CLR 430 (HCA). 
35 Elmiger v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1967] NZLR 161 (CA). 
36 Ben Nevis Forestry Ventures Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2008] NZSC 115, [2009] 2 NZLR 289. 
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earnings, so once deducted they lead to a reduction in assessable income. Therefore, by 
increasing deductions without having actually paid for the expenses claimed, taxpayers are 
able to reduce their assessable income and tax liability.  
B Cases 
1 Cecil Bros Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation 
The taxpayer in Cecil Bros, Cecil Bros Pty Ltd, sold shoes.37 It could have purchased the 
shoes from a wholesaler, but instead purchased them from a company, Breckler Pty Ltd, 
owned by family members of Cecil Bros shareholders for a higher price. The arrangement 
enabled Cecil Bros to inflate its deductions by £19,777,38 and Breckler made a profit of 
£19,777.39 If one dispenses with the corporate veil, however, since Cecil Bros and Breckler 
were owned by members of the same family, in reality the shoes did not cost the family 
£19,777, because Cecil Bros paid the £19,777 and Breckler received it.  The Commissioner 
argued that the GAAR applied.40 
Dixon CJ held that since the payment from Cecil Bros to Breckler was for trading stock, the 
payment had to be an allowable deduction and the GAAR could not apply.41 He said that he 
could not identify any arrangement that the GAAR could apply to on the facts of Cecil Bros, 
and that the GAAR could not apply to “truly allowable” deductions. 42  Menzies J said that 
applying the GAAR would not affect the taxpayer’s tax liability, because it would not 
replace the contracts between the taxpayer and Breckler with contracts between the taxpayer 
                                                
37 Cecil Bros Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation, above n 34, at 433. 
38 At 433. 
39 At 433. 
40 At 438. 
41 At 438. 
42 At 438 per Dixon CJ; at 439 per Taylor J.  
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and the wholesaler.43 There was no evidence to suggest that the taxpayer’s actual outgoings 
were less than the amount it paid to Breckler, or that Cecil Bros had gifted the amount to 
Breckler.44 Cecil Bros simply purchased shoes at a higher price than the “best price” it could 
have obtained.45 As a result, the court did not apply the GAAR.  
Despite being heard after Newton,46 the judges in Cecil Bros do not mention the predication 
test. Were the predication test applied to the facts in Cecil Bros, the arrangement could have 
qualified as a tax avoidance arrangement. Since the GAAR at the time was an annihilating 
provision, Menzies J said that the court would have been unable to replace the contracts 
between Breckler and Cecil Bros with contracts between Cecil Bros and the wholesaler.47 
Arguably, however, the court could have applied the GAAR by ignoring Breckler’s 
existence. The court could have held that whatever happened within Breckler happened to 
Cecil Bros, with only the smaller payment recognised as having gone to the wholesaler, 
voiding the inflated payment. This is similar to what occurred in Elmiger,48 in which the 
courts ignored the existence of a trust, and recognised profits as being in the hands of the 
Elmiger partnership instead. In legal reasoning, the whole includes the part, so surely the 
courts are capable of ignoring part of the whole.  
The court does not discuss the choice principle in Cecil Bros, but the case seems consistent 
with the principle because of the court’s focus on legal form over substance. This is evident 
in the court’s unwillingness to view the arrangement as anything other than an ordinary 
                                                
43 At 439 per Menzies J. 
44 At 442 per Menzies J. 
45 At 442 per Menzies J. 
46 Newton v Federal Commissioner of Taxation, above n 4. See pp 8-10. 
47 At 442 per Menzies J. 
48 Elmiger v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 35. See pp 15-16. 
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business dealing, albeit with the taxpayer paying a higher price than necessary for trading 
stock.  
2 Elmiger v Commissioner of Inland Revenue 
In Elmiger, the taxpayers, the Elmiger brothers, operated an earth-moving business.49 Their 
very profitable business required them to use and own heavy machinery.50 They entered into 
an arrangement to reduce their assessable income through inflating their deductions, by 
setting up a family trust and selling two of their machines to it in exchange for an interest-
free loan.51 The trust and the Elmigers entered into contracts which provided for the hire of 
the machines to the Elmigers in exchange for rent.52 The Elmigers then deducted the rent 
they paid each month. The rent, which comprised the trust’s income, was distributed to the 
trust’s beneficiaries or returned to the Elmigers in payment of the loan. While legally the 
Elmigers were paying the rent, in reality they retained most of the rent because of the 
arrangement, and they received a ‘free’ dividend that reduced their assessable income and 
overall tax liability. The Commissioner argued that the GAAR applied.53  
The court applied the Newton predication test,54 holding that the principal purpose of the 
arrangement was to enable the Elmigers to reduce their assessable income by inflating their 
deductions.55 The arrangement was incapable of explanation as an ordinary business or 
family dealing,56 so the GAAR applied to the arrangement.57 
                                                
49 Elmiger v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 35, at 188. 
50 At 188 per McCarthy J. 
51 At 188 per McCarthy J. 
52 At 188 per McCarthy J. 
53 At 176 per North P.  
54 Newton v Federal Commissioner of Taxation, above n 4. See pp 8-10. 
55 Elmiger v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 35, at 6 per Turner J.   
56 At 183 per North P.  
57 At 188 per Turner J.  
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The choice principle is not mentioned in Elmiger, but the decision is clearly contrary to the 
principle in the light of statements made by the judges and their application of the 
predication test.58 
3 Ben Nevis Forestry Ventures Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue 
In Ben Nevis, the taxpayers entered in an arrangement known as the “Trinity scheme”, which 
enabled them to claim deductions for expenses they had not actually paid for. 59   The 
taxpayers operated as part of a syndicate, entering into the arrangements through their agent, 
Southern Lakes Forestry Ltd. As part of the arrangements, Southern Lakes and Trinity 3 
entered into two agreements regarding a lot within Redcliffe Station, which was land that 
Trinity 3 owned.60  
The first agreement provided that Trinity 3 would issue the taxpayers a licence to use the lot 
to conduct a forestry business in exchange for a licence premium due at the end of the 
licence’s term. The second agreement listed the terms of the licence, set out that 484 hectares 
were plantable, and provided for various fees associated with the licence that the taxpayers 
would have to pay towards the end of the term of the licence. The agreement also required 
the taxpayers to plant and maintain a forest on the land,61  and pay two premiums for 
insurance at the beginning and end of the lease.62  
The taxpayers had already incurred the licence and insurance premiums, since they were 
expenses incurred on an accrual basis, but they wanted to ensure that the premiums were 
deductible. To ensure the deductibility of the premiums, the taxpayers issued promissory 
                                                
58See also Dandelion Investments Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2003] 1 NZLR 600 (CA), a similar 
case to Elmiger.  
59 Ben Nevis Forestry Ventures Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 36, at [14]. 
60 At [16]. 
61 At [20]-[22]. 
62 At [28]. 
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notes, which the taxpayers believed were the legal equivalent of actual payment. 63  This 
belief was based on existing contract law cases, in which the courts had said that promissory 
notes were equivalent to payment. The intended effect of the arrangement was to reduce the 
taxpayers’ tax liability by ensuring they were able to claim deductions for payments they 
had not actually made. 64   The Commissioner argued that the GAAR applied to the 
arrangement to reduce the taxpayers’ allowable deductions.  
The majority said that when determining whether the GAAR applies, it is necessary to 
determine “whether the commercial reality of a transaction is consistent with its legal 
form”.65 Transactions that use specific provisions to reduce taxpayers’ tax liability will be 
exempt from the application of the GAAR only if Parliament intended the provisions to 
provide taxpayers the tax advantage claimed by them.66  The court added that specific 
provisions work “in tandem” with the GAAR without overriding each other, saying that 
Parliament must have intended the GAAR to apply in situations where the application of 
specific provisions has turned an arrangement into a tax avoidance arrangement. 67  In 
deciding whether an arrangement is an avoidance arrangement:68 
The ultimate question is whether the impugned arrangement, viewed in a commercially and 
economically realistic way, makes use of the specific provision in a manner that is consistent 
with Parliament’s purpose. 
The syndicate argued that the courts should not deprive taxpayers of choices that provide 
taxpayers with tax benefits.69 The majority responded by saying that taxpayers may choose 
                                                
63 At [28]. 
64 At [29]-[31]. 
65 At [95]. 
66 At [97]. 
67 At [103]-[104]. 
68 At [109]. 
69 At [111]. 
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how to structure their transactions and use tax incentives, provided their transactions are 
permissible in the light of legislative context and purpose:70 
 [T]axpayers have the freedom to structure transactions to their best advantage. They may 
utilise available tax incentives in whatever way the applicable legislative text, read in light 
of its context and purpose, permits. They cannot, however, do so in a way that is proscribed 
by the general anti-avoidance provision. 
Applying its findings to the facts of Ben Nevis, the court held that the GAAR applied because 
the primary purpose of the arrangement was to avoid tax. First, the taxpayers paid more for 
the licence than the cost of purchasing the land outright.71 Second, there was a real risk that 
the scheme would be unprofitable.72 Lastly, there was a timing mismatch between the point 
at which the taxpayers legally incurred the expenditure and when the taxpayers actually paid 
for it at the end of the licence.73 Evidence also showed that the insurance arrangement was 
circular in nature.74  Therefore, while ordinarily the taxpayers would have been able to 
deduct the amounts claimed, the GAAR applied because the taxpayers had taken advantage 
of specific provisions in a manner contrary to Parliamentary contemplation.75 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Ben Nevis leaves no room for the application of the choice 
principle. While the court says that taxpayers have a choice in [111], 76 and are able to 
“structure transactions to their best advantage” and take advantage of tax incentives, this 
choice is illusory when put against the GAAR. Ben Nevis seems to indicate that unless 
                                                
70 At [111]. 
71 At [121]. 
72 At [120]. 
73 At [120]. 
74 See [138], [144] and [148]. 
75 At [156]. 
76 See quote above. 
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taxpayers can show that their use of specific provisions in arrangements was within 
Parliamentary contemplation, the GAAR will apply.  
IV Splitting Income  
A Context 
In Peate v Federal Commissioner of Taxation, 77  Mangin v Commissioner of Inland 
Revenue,78 Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Gulland, Watson v Federal Commissioner 
of Taxation, and Pincus v Federal Commissioner of Taxation,79 and Penny v Commissioner 
of Inland Revenue,80 taxpayers split their incomes by diverting their incomes to family 
members. The cases involved taxpayers selling their businesses to trusts/companies and 
hiring out their services to the trusts/companies in exchange for salaries. The 
trusts/companies then continued to run the businesses as before and distributed any profits 
to family members, who were either shareholders or beneficiaries. This meant that the 
taxpayers’ incomes were split between multiple people, allowing them to take advantage of 
the lower tax rates provided to family members with low existing incomes. 
B Cases 
1 Peate v Federal Commissioner of Taxation 
In Peate, the taxpayer, Dr Peate, was part of a partnership. 81  Under the partnership 
agreement, he received fourteen per cent of the partnership’s profits.82 Each doctor in the 
                                                
77 Peate v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1966) 116 CLR 38 (HCA). 
78 Mangin v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1971] NZLR 519 (PC). 
79 Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Gulland, Watson v Federal Commissioner of Taxation, and Pincus v 
Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1985) 85 ATC 4765 (HCA). 
80 Penny v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2011] NZSC 95, [2012] 1 NZLR 433. 
81 Peate v Federal Commissioner of Taxation, above n 77, at 40. 
82 At 40. 
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partnership entered into arrangements that provided them with tax benefits.83 They dissolved 
the partnership, formed family companies which purchased the practices and assets of the 
doctors, and entered into service agreements between the family companies and an 
overarching company called Westbank Pty Ltd. The family companies held shares in 
Westbank proportionate to the profits the doctors would have received under the partnership 
agreement. The service agreement between the taxpayer’s family company, Rayleigh Pty 
Ltd, and Westbank provided that all payments made directly to the taxpayers would go to 
the family companies.84 Any profit Rayleigh made was distributed to Mr Peate’s family, 
who were shareholders in Rayleigh. This allowed Dr Peate to split his income, lowering the 
rate at which the income was taxed and decreasing the overall amount of tax paid.85 The 
Commissioner argued that the GAAR applied. 
The court applied the GAAR, holding that Dr Peate was avoiding tax by means of the 
arrangement. The court taxed him as though the partnership had continued and he was 
receiving the practice’s income directly.86 The court did not consider the choice principle, 
but the decision is inconsistent with the principle because of the court’s clear emphasis on 
the importance of the substance over legal form when deciding whether to apply the GAAR. 
2 Mangin v Commissioner of Inland Revenue 
The taxpayer, Mr Mangin, owned a pastoral farm with one paddock per year in wheat.87 
Every year he grew the wheat in a different paddock, and because the wheat paddock was 
more profitable than all of his other paddocks, he entered into an arrangement to reduce his 
tax liability in relation to that paddock. He had previously received all income from the 
                                                
83 At 42.  
84 At 40. 
85 At 42. 
86 At 43. 
87 Mangin v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 78, at 1. 
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wheat farm directly, but to spread his tax liability, he created a family trust to which he 
leased the paddock.88 The trust reimbursed Mr Mangin for his labour and expenses incurred 
while working the land.89 His wife and children, beneficiaries of the trust, received any 
remaining profits.90 The Commissioner sought to assess the income of the trust as if Mr 
Mangin had received all of it directly, arguing that the GAAR applied.91  
The majority in the Privy Council applied the GAAR to void the arrangement and increase 
the taxpayer’s assessable income, seeming to reject the choice principle by implication. Lord 
Donovan did, however, state that the GAAR does not apply to all transactions that cause 
taxpayers’ tax liability to decrease.92 In relation to the predication test from Newton,93 he 
said:94 
In their Lordships’ view this passage [the predication test], properly interpreted, does not 
mean that every transaction having as one of its ingredients some tax saving feature thereby 
becomes caught by [the GAAR] … If a bona fide business transaction can be carried through 
in two ways, one involving less liability to tax than the other, their Lordships do not think s 
108 [the GAAR] can properly be invoked to declare the transaction wholly or partly void 
merely because the way involving less tax is chosen. 
As examples, Lord Donovan says that directors may have a duty to shareholders to structure 
transactions in ways that attract less tax, and that trustees may deliberately choose 
investments with tax advantages in the best interests of beneficiaries. He adds, however, that 
where tax avoidance is an arrangement’s sole or principal purpose, the GAAR will apply.95 
                                                
88 At 1. 
89 At 1. 
90 At 1. 
91 At 5. 
92 At 7. 
93 Newton v Federal Commissioner of Taxation, above n 4. See pp 8-10. 
94 At 7. 
95 At 7. 
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3 Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Gulland, Watson v Federal Commissioner of 
Taxation, and Pincus v Federal Commissioner of Taxation 
Drs Gulland, Watson, and Pincus were in partnerships.96 They dissolved the partnerships, 
and used trusts to split their incomes.97 They sold their practices to the trusts, continuing to 
operate their practices as before, but with the profits of the practices going to the trusts rather 
than directly to the taxpayers. The taxpayers received their salaries via service trusts that 
hired their services to the family trusts.98 The taxpayers, their wives, and children were the 
beneficiaries of the trusts. 99  Although the arrangements involved trusts rather than 
companies, the facts of Gulland are very similar to Peate.100 The Commissioner argued that 
the GAAR applied.101 
The High Court of Australia utilised the Newton predication test, and held that the GAAR 
applied.102 Gibbs CJ said that applying the GAAR to Gulland was consistent with the choice 
principle. This was because Keighery, and other cases that applied the choice principle:103 
[S]howed that the general rule enunciated by Lord Denning in [Newton]104 is displaced when 
the purpose of the arrangement in question is to make use of a tax advantage for which the 
Act provides. 
                                                
96 Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Gulland, above n 79, at 64-65. 
97 At 64-65. 
98 At 64-65. 
99 At 65. 
100 Peate v Federal Commissioner of Taxation, above n 77. See pp 19-20. 
101 Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Gulland, above n 79, at 66. 
102 Newton v Federal Commissioner of Taxation, above n 4. See pp 8-10. 
103 Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Gulland, above n 79, at 71. 
104 Newton v Federal Commissioner of Taxation, above n 4. See pp 8-10. 
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The taxpayers argued that the choice principle applied, because they “did no more than adopt 
the course, available under the Act, of creating trusts, the income of which would be taxed 
in accordance with [legislation].” Gibbs J rejected their argument:105 
That argument … fails because it is simply not right to say that the Act allows a taxpayer 
the opportunity to have his own income from personal exertion taxed as though it were 
income derived by a trust and held for the benefit of a number of beneficiaries.  
The choice principle applies only to “give effect to a ‘specific provision’ of the Act”, by 
reading down the GAAR to enable specific provisions to apply in accordance with 
Parliamentary intent.106 The principle does not apply to arrangements that enable taxpayers 
to divert their income to other taxpayers, such as occurred in the present case, Peate, and 
Mangin.107 The court held that the arrangements were artificial, and were not ordinary 
family or business dealings. Therefore, the GAAR applied.108 
The dissent by Deane J in Gulland applied the choice principle and found in the taxpayers’ 
favour. He said that whether the choice principle applies is not dependant on legislative 
intent, but requires courts to give effect to whatever legal form the taxpayers have chosen.109 
While he would have preferred to apply the GAAR, he applied the choice principle because 
it was the “settled” construction of the GAAR.110  
Gibbs CJ’s reasoning seems to distinguish between targeted and structured avoidance. He 
appears to say that the choice principle applies only where taxpayers engage in targeted 
avoidance, which is where taxpayers deliberately structure arrangements to take advantage 
                                                
105 Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Gulland, above n 79, at 71 per Gibbs CJ. 
106 At 80 per Brennan J. 
107 At 80 per Brennan J. 
108 At 84 per Brennan J. 
109 At 92 per Deane J. 
110 At 95 per Deane J. 
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of specific provisions to reduce their tax liability. In contrast, structured avoidance is where 
taxpayers use fundamentally legitimate business arrangements to reduce their tax liability. 
Both types of avoidance ultimately rely on specific provisions, however, so Gibbs CJ’s 
implied distinction between the two is arguably artificial.111 Moreover, the Keighery line of 
cases includes both structured and targeted avoidance cases, and exogenous and endogenous 
cases.112 Therefore, Gibbs CJ’s suggestion that the choice principle only applies in targeted 
avoidance cases, and his conclusion that the choice principle must, as a result, be consistent 
with structured avoidance cases like Newton, seems incorrect. Deane J’s approach, on the 
other hand, seems more logical, because he does not distinguish between targeted and 
structured avoidance.  
4 Penny v Commissioner of Inland Revenue 
Penny is factually similar to Peate and Gulland. The taxpayers, Drs Penny and Hooper, were 
orthopaedic surgeons who sold their practices to companies, the shareholders of which were 
the doctors’ family trusts.113 The companies hired the doctors and paid them salaries, and 
the remaining income of the practices was split amongst the beneficiaries of the trusts, who 
received the income after the companies distributed their profits to the family trusts.114 Dr 
Hooper entered into the arrangement after the personal income tax rate increased.115 Dr 
Penny had already structured his business in the way described prior to the increase, but 
once the personal income tax rate increased, the company reduced his salary significantly.116 
The Commissioner argued that the GAAR applied to the arrangements.117 
                                                
111 See also p 34. 
112 See pp 11-12. 
113 Penny v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 80, at [1] and [2]. 
114 At [1] and [2]. 
115 At [3]. 
116 At [3]. 
117 At [1]. 
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The court held that the GAAR applied, because tax avoidance was one of the purposes of 
the arrangements. 118  The taxpayers argued that they devised the arrangements for the 
dominant purpose of protecting themselves from negligence claims, but the court rejected 
this argument for various reasons, including the existence of the ACC scheme and the 
taxpayers’ existing insurance cover.119  The taxpayers agreed that they would not have 
entered into such arrangements with non-family members, and that their salaries were 
“commercially unrealistic”. 120  As a result, the court applied the GAAR to void the 
arrangements. 
V Tax Loss Grouping Provisions 
A Context 
The taxpayers in Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Challenge Corporation Ltd121 and 
Miller v Commissioner of Inland Revenue122 used tax loss grouping provisions to reduce 
their tax liability. Tax loss grouping provisions enable companies to offset their profits 
against losses suffered by other companies within the same group of companies. The tax 
loss grouping provision in the Income Tax Act 2007 is section DV 17:123 
 (2) To the extent set out in section FM 11, if [a] consolidated group124 would be allowed a 
deduction for an item of expenditure or loss as 1 company because of a nexus between the 
                                                
118 At [36]. 
119 At [35]-[36]. 
120 At [16]. 
121 Challenge Corporation Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1986] 2 NZLR 513 (PC). 
122 Miller v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2001] 3 NZLR 316 (PC). 
123 Income Tax Act 2007, s DV 17. 
124 Section FM 35 of the Income Tax Act 2007 provides that “two or more companies may choose to form a 
consolidated group of companies” provided the companies are “a wholly-owned group of companies” and 
meet eligibility requirements set out in s FM 31. 
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expenditure and the income or carrying on of a business by another group company, a 
company that is part of the consolidated group is allowed a deduction. 
In Challenge and Miller, the taxpayers entered into arrangements to take advantage of losses 
that they were not economically entitled to, and used the tax loss grouping provisions in a 
way outside of what was intended by Parliament. In Challenge, the taxpayer purchased a 
company with tax losses after the company had generated the losses. In Miller, the taxpayers 
sold shares to a company controlled by their promoter, Mr Russell, so that their company 
would become part of a group that had tax losses. In both cases, the courts held that the 
GAAR applied. 
B Cases 
1 Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Challenge Corporation Ltd 
In Challenge Corporation, the taxpayer, Challenge Corporation Ltd, purchased Perth 
Property Developments Ltd for $10,000. Perth had sustained a tax loss of $5.8 million, 
which Challenge attempted to use to reduce its tax liability by transferring Perth's losses to 
itself because they were within the same group of companies, as provided for by ss 188 and 
191 of the Income Tax Act 1976.125 The Commissioner argued that the GAAR applied, 
while Challenge argued that the GAAR did not apply because it was using specific 
provisions to gain the tax advantage.126  
The Court of Appeal held that the GAAR did not apply.127 The dissenting judge, Woodhouse 
P, rejected the choice principle in his judgment. He said that the Newton predication test was 
                                                
125 Challenge Corporation Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 121, at 1-6. 
126 At 2 and 6. 
127 Challenge Corporation Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1986] 2 NZLR 513 (CA).  
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entirely different from the choice principle.128 Woodhouse P rejected the choice principle as 
being “not in accord with the purpose and effect intended by Parliament” for the GAAR, 
concluding that it should not be adopted in New Zealand.129  
The Privy Council reversed the Court of Appeal decision. Lord Templeman, a member of 
the majority, held that the GAAR applied because the taxpayer never suffered the $5.8 
million loss, since Perth sustained the loss before it became a part of the Challenge group of 
companies.130 The only purpose of the agreement was to provide the taxpayer with a tax 
benefit through transferring Perth's loss to itself and decreasing its assessable income,131 
which seems to be a clear implied rejection of the choice principle, especially when 
compared with other cases.132  
In his dissenting judgment in the Privy Council, Lord Oliver seemed to implicitly apply the 
choice principle. He stated that the GAAR could not apply to the taxpayer's arrangement in 
Challenge, because otherwise the specific provisions relied upon by the taxpayer would be 
completely redundant. 133  This was because the specific provisions gave the taxpayer 
company "options" as to how to structure its business, and this included options that enabled 
the taxpayer to reduce its tax liability.134 He concluded that allowing the GAAR to apply 
without limitation to all sections of the Act would lead to absurd results, so the GAAR did 
not apply to the taxpayer's arrangement in Challenge.135 
                                                
128 At 538. 
129 At 538. 
130 Challenge Corporation Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 121, at 6. 
131 At 6. 
132 For example, Federal Commmissioner of Taxation v Gulland, above n 79. See pp 22-24. 
133 At 14 per Lord Oliver. 
134 At 14 per Lord Oliver. 
135 At 15 per Lord Oliver. 
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The majority decision reinforces the New Zealand position that the choice principle has no 
application, and that the GAAR applies to arrangements with tax avoidance purposes. While 
the minority decision does leave open the possibility that the choice principle could be 
applied in future where specific provisions are concerned, it is clear from other cases 
discussed in this paper that New Zealand courts have never adopted the choice principle, 
either explicitly or implicitly. 
2 Miller v Commissioner of Inland Revenue 
In Miller, the taxpayers, the Millers and the O’Neils, entered into an arrangement that 
reduced their tax liability. The arrangement involved taking advantage of tax loss grouping 
provisions.136 The taxpayers sold their shares in a company (“the taxpayers’ company”) to 
a company controlled by Mr Russell, the promoter of the scheme, with the taxpayers 
receiving no actual money but instead a mortgage secured over the shares.137 The taxpayers 
remained registered as shareholders, declaring that they held the shares in trust for Mr 
Russell’s company, but the taxpayers’ company continued operating as it had before the 
sale.138 The arrangement had the effect of making the taxpayers’ company a member of a 
group of companies controlled by Mr Russell.139 Some of the companies in the group had 
tax losses, which enabled Mr Russell’s company to receive profits from the company 
without having to pay tax on them.140 As part of the arrangement, the taxpayers’ company 
paid, out of its profits, a regular administration charge to Mr Russell’s company. Mr 
Russell’s company retained some of each charge as payment for his services, with the 
                                                
136 Miller v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 122, at [6]-[8]. 
137 At [6]. 
138 At [6]. 
139 At [6]. 
140 At [6]. 
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remainder of each charge paid back to the taxpayers in instalments for the debt owed to them 
by Mr Russell’s company for the shares.141 
The Privy Council said that the scheme was “highly artificial”, and was a “unitary 
arrangement to enable the company’s net profits to be shared between the shareholders and 
Mr Russell.”142 Lord Hoffman said that Miller was a “paradigm” of the type of arrangement 
to which Parliament intended the GAAR to apply.143 The arrangement provided tax benefits 
to various people:144 
The artificial grouping of the trading company with Mr Russell’s tax loss companies made 
the scheme viable because it enabled his companies to receive the profits without themselves 
becoming liable to tax. The artificial arrangements for payment by the trading company of 
administration and consultancy fees enabled the trading companies to eliminate their own 
liability to tax by claiming deductions under s 104 of the Act. And of course the primary 
objective of the scheme was to give the appellants the tax advantage of receiving part of the 
company’s profits without paying income tax. 
As a result, the GAAR applied. The Privy Council does not mention the choice principle in 
Miller, but its application of the GAAR and statements regarding the artificiality and blatant 
tax avoidance purpose of the arrangement make it clear that the decision impliedly rejects 
the choice principle. 
                                                
141 At [7] and [8]. 
142 At [9] and [10]. 
143 At [10]. 
144 At [11]. 
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VI Commissioner’s Position: 2013 Interpretation Statement 
The New Zealand Inland Revenue Department released an interpretation statement on 
sections BG 1 and GA 1 of the Income Tax Act 2007.145 Section BG 1 is the GAAR, and 
section GA 1 is a provision that enables the Commissioner to make adjustments following 
the application of the GAAR to an arrangement. The interpretation statement “outlines the 
Commissioner’s view of the law on tax avoidance in New Zealand” and “sets out the 
approach the Commissioner will take” to the sections.146  
The interpretation statement briefly defines and set out the history of the choice principle.147 
In [508]-[510] the Commissioner explains the applicability of the choice principle after the 
decisions in Ben Nevis and Penny:148 
[509] The general anti-avoidance provision proscribes arrangements that use the Act in a 
way Parliament did not contemplate. While taxpayers are free to structure their arrangements 
using structures recognised in the Act, if those structures use provisions in a way that is 
outside Parliament’s contemplation, then the arrangement may be a tax avoidance 
arrangement. 
She provides an example of a situation outside of Parliament’s contemplation:149 
For example, a taxpayer may choose to sell or lease an asset and different tax consequences 
will follow from that choice. If a taxpayer structures an arrangement to use the lease 
provisions but, when the commercial and economic reality of the arrangement is examined, 
                                                
145 Interpretation Statement: Tax avoidance and the interpretation of sections BG 1 and GA 1 of the Income 
Tax Act 2007 (Inland Revenue Public Rulings Unit, IS 13/01, 13 June 2013). 
146 At [1]. 
147 At [503]-[507]. 
148 Ben Nevis Forestry Ventures Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 36. See pp 16-19. Penny v 
Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 80. See pp 24-25. 
149 At [509]. 
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the reality is that the arrangement is a sale, then the use of the lease provisions may be outside 
Parliament’s contemplation. 
The Commissioner then discusses Penny, and explains why the taxpayers’ arrangements 
were outside of Parliament’s contemplation: 
[510] The Supreme Court in Penny (SC) said that while the taxpayers had a choice to transfer 
their businesses to companies owned by their family trusts (at [33]), other aspects of the 
arrangement meant it was still a tax avoidance arrangement. The commercial and economic 
reality of the arrangement, when looked at as a whole, was that the taxpayers still received 
the full benefit of the income and effectively derived it. 
In cases like Ben Nevis and Penny, the courts recognised that the GAAR does not flow 
logically, and that this is necessary so that the GAAR is able to catch a wide range of 
avoidance arrangements. This contrasts with cases like Cridland, 150  in which judges 
extrapolate taxpayers’ ability to make choices to the extreme, using logic to justify their 
application of the choice principle.151 In New Zealand, Cridland would have immediately 
qualified as a clear case of tax avoidance to which the GAAR applied. The approach taken 
in Penny and Ben Nevis seems to be the correct one, despite the apparent illogicality of the 
GAAR and its application.  
In New Zealand, the choice taxpayers purportedly have in structuring their arrangements, 
when put against the GAAR, is virtually non-existent, as discussed above in relation to [111] 
of Ben Nevis.152 The taxpayers in Ben Nevis and Penny may have been able to choose how 
                                                
150 Cridland v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1977) 140 CLR 330 (HCA).  
151 Cridland involved a taxpayer who used specific provisions to avoid tax. He was not actually involved in 
primary production, but he acquired an interest in a unit trust involved in primary production so that he could 
benefit from specific provisions allowing primary producers to average out their incomes over a number of 
years. 
152 See pp 16-19. 
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to structure their affairs, but once the court held that the taxpayers entered into the 
arrangements for tax avoidance purposes, the GAAR overrode their choices. If the Supreme 
Court in Ben Nevis and Penny had applied the choice principle, as originally formulated in 
Keighery and applied subsequently in cases such as Slutzkin,153 the court probably would 
not have applied the GAAR. In Keighery, the High Court of Australia declined to apply the 
choice principle, despite an admission by the taxpayer of the tax avoidance purpose behind 
the arrangement. In Slutzkin, the court recognised the significant tax benefits gained by the 
taxpayer by entering the arrangement, but still held that the GAAR did not apply because 
legal form trumped substance. Therefore, Ben Nevis, Penny, and the Commissioner’s 
interpretation statement seem to reject firmly any future application of the choice principle 
in New Zealand. 
VII Critique of the Choice Principle 
GAARs are necessary, because it would be impossible for Parliament to draft specific 
provisions that cover every possible tax avoidance arrangement. Taxpayers are constantly 
testing the boundaries of what is permissible in the context of tax avoidance, and a GAAR 
provides the law flexibility to combat innovative tax avoidance arrangements.  
While the GAAR is effective at ensuring the government is not denied revenue from 
taxpayers seeking to avoid tax, it detrimentally affects the business climate because of the 
uncertainty GAARs unavoidably create. This uncertainty is caused by taxpayers being 
unsure as to whether the GAAR will apply to their arrangements because of the GAAR’s 
undefined scope. Such uncertainty is also contrary to the rule of law, which requires laws to 
                                                
153 Slutzkin v Federal Commissioner of Taxation, above n 5. See pp 10-12. 
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be “relatively certain in order to conform to the principles of the rule of law.”154 The choice 
principle removes this uncertainty by assuring taxpayers that their arrangements will not be 
considered tax avoidance arrangements provided they have chosen between legally available 
alternatives. Therefore, by rejecting the choice principle, taxpayers are denied certainty. This 
uncertainty may be justifiable, however, given the benefits derived from the GAAR 
preventing tax avoidance. 
Prebble and Prebble argue that GAARs serve to uphold “the principle of horizontal equity” 
and ensure that tax systems are “economically neutral”.155 The application of a GAAR helps 
to ensure that taxpayers in economically comparable positions pay tax at the same rate,156 
and that the market is not distorted by taxpayers deliberately entering into arrangements 
solely to gain tax benefits.157 By preventing tax avoidance, the GAAR also ensures that the 
government is not denied the revenue needed to function, and fund services and systems 
such as education, healthcare, and social welfare.158 Therefore, Prebble and Prebble argue 
that the GAAR is necessary, despite the uncertainty it creates.159 
The Inland Revenue’s interpretation statement mentioned above also discusses the necessity 
of the GAAR despite its effect on certainty.160 The Commissioner cites various cases, saying 
that Parliament has deliberately chosen not to provide certainty through enacting the 
GAAR 161  because having “clear, bright-line rules is undesirable and impracticable in 
taxation law.”162 The Commissioner argues that most avoidance arrangements would fall far 
                                                
154 Rebecca Prebble and John Prebble “Does the Use of GAARs to Combat Tax Avoidance Breach Principles 
of the Rule of Law?” (2012) 2 VUWLRP 8/2012 at 28. 
155 At 38 and 39.  
156 At 38. 
157 At 39 and 40.  
158 At 40. 
159 At 40, 41 and 45. 
160 Interpretation Statement, above n 146. See pp 30-32. 
161 At [549]-[559]. 
162 At [552].  
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short of qualifying as tax avoidance arrangements, with only extreme cases at risk of being 
caught by the GAAR, and that the law on tax avoidance provides sufficient clarity.163 She 
cites Ben Nevis:164 
As in many areas of the law, there are bound to be difficult cases at the margins. But in most 
cases we consider it will be possible, without undue difficulty, to decide on which side of 
the line a particular arrangement falls. 
Another reason the choice principle should not be adopted in New Zealand is the artificiality 
of the distinctions made by judges, such as Gibbs CJ, when determining whether the choice 
principle applies.165 The artificial distinctions could lead to perverse results, and difficulties 
in deciding whether to apply the principle. Gibbs CJ’s implied suggestion in Gulland that 
the choice principle applies in targeted avoidance cases but not in structured avoidance cases 
is bizarre,166 because if the choice principle applied only in targeted avoidance cases, the 
GAAR would only apply in structured avoidance cases. This would lead to the perverse 
result of the GAAR applying only to less obvious forms of avoidance, because targeted 
avoidance cases usually involve more blatant tax avoidance arrangements, while structured 
avoidance cases are generally more difficult to detect.167 The implied distinction made by 
the courts between structured and targeted avoidance,168 and the impact of whether a case is 
a structured avoidance case or a targeted avoidance case on whether the GAAR applies, is 
also illogical, as illustrated by the Cecil Bros case.169 Cecil Bros arguably involved both 
structured and targeted avoidance. It involved structured avoidance, because the taxpayer 
                                                
163 At [557] and [559]. 
164 At [558]. Quotation from Ben Nevis Forestry Ventures Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue, above n 36, 
at [112], as cited in the interpretative statement.  
165 See pp 11-12 and 23-24. 
166 See pp 23-24. 
167 For example, compare the arrangements in Ben Nevis with Cridland. 
168 See pp 23-24. 
169 See pp 13-15. 
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implemented a business model that inflated its deductions. It also involved targeted 
avoidance, because to avoid tax the taxpayer had to rely on the general permission. Therefore, 
arguably there is no real difference between the different types of cases. As a result, the 
choice principle should either apply to both structured and targeted avoidance cases, or not 
apply at all. If the choice principle applied in both types of avoidance, the GAAR would 
become redundant, however, so the only logical conclusion must be that the choice principle 
does not have any application.  
There are clearly strong arguments in favour of the general anti-avoidance as it currently 
stands in New Zealand, despite the uncertainty it creates, and these arguments seem to 
override the need for the certainty the choice principle would provide. The choice principle 
would counteract the remedies to tax avoidance generated by the GAAR, and arguably have 
a detrimental effect on New Zealand. Potentially, adopting the choice principle into New 
Zealand law would affect the amount of revenue gathered by the government, allow some 
taxpayers to pay tax at rates lower than those paid by other taxpayers of comparable 
economic wealth, and cause market distortions by enabling investors to enter arrangements 
for the sole purpose of deriving tax benefits. The arguments mentioned above regarding 
targeted and structured avoidance, as well as endogenous and exogenous avoidance cases, 
also support the rejection of the choice principle. Therefore, the rejection of the choice 
principle by the courts and the Inland Revenue department is probably for the best. 
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